


PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON

10 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Walter B. Smith, Director CIA <

Subject: Psychological Strategy Board Meeting Minutes

The attached minutes of the Third Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (September 27, 1951) are furnished for approval or for such correction as you think necessary. I am of the opinion that Board actions can be expedited if we secure approval of the minutes immediately after they are prepared instead of waiting for the next meeting of the Board. For your convenience in considering these minutes, a revised copy of PSB D-4, "Role of the Psychological Strategy Board under 4/4/51 Presidential Directive," is attached.


Gordon Gray
Director

Inclosures

NSC review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET

PSB M-3

Copy 1 of 50

M I N U T E S

Third Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
September 27, 1951, 2:00 p.m.

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director of the Psychological Strategy Board,
presiding

MEMBERS:

Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Allen Dulles, acting for Director of Central Intelligence

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:


Special Assistant to the President - Mr. W. Averell Harriman
Department of State

Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett
Department of Defense

Major General John A. Magruder (Retired)
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brigadier General Desmond Balmer
Psychological Strategy Board Staff

Mr. Robert Cutler (Present for the early part of the meeting.)
Colonel Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel Paul C. Davis
Mr. Joseph B. Phillips
Mr. John Sherman
Mr. Charles E. Johnson
Mr. Albert P. Toner, Acting Secretary



Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel, USA
Executive Officer

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1. Role of Psychological Strategy Board under 4/4/51 Presidential Directive (PSB D-4, Revised 25 Sept. 1951)

The document was approved with the amendments suggested below:

MR. GRAY called attention to the revised language in the last paragraphs of pages 1 and 2. He noted that the Presidential Directive is so broad with respect to the evaluation function that it is necessary to emphasize that evaluation will be limited to the most important programs.

MR. WEBB said that the State Department generally approves the paper, but that he wished to make several suggestions for the sake of greater precision. The amendments follow, and the approved document is attached:

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B. Delete the second sentence of page 1, paragraph 2 and add A Director, appointed by the President, sees that the decisions of the Board are carried out.

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D. Page 1, paragraph 3, line 7 should read "assessment of these psychological . . ."

E. Page 1, last paragraph, line 2 - Delete "comprehensive" and change "a" to an.

F. Page 1, last paragraph, line 4 - Delete "National Security Council" and add appropriate agencies of the government. (MR. WEBB pointed out that the President personally makes the National Security Council agenda selections and carefully controls the sources of agenda items. Mr. Webb is especially concerned that papers should originate in the agency of major interest in the subject, and that the PSB should not now be considered as such an originating agency since its component members discharge that function. He would prefer that the PSB request the appropriate agency to propose NSC agenda items through, for example, the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.)

G. Page 1, last paragraph, line 5 - Delete "and" and add or, so as to read, "adoption or development . . ."

MR. GRAY explained with respect to items F and G above that the desired meaning is that the Board would ask for a policy should policy gaps be encountered, and that in some cases the Board might be in a better position to recommend a policy than one of the agencies. He did not believe that all policy involving psychological operations

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should originate with the Board but felt that the Board should be able in particular cases to recommend policy.

With reference to the last clause in paragraph 2, the question was raised as to whether the Board actually could "add to its number . . ." It was pointed out that the language in the paper is taken almost verbatim from the Presidential directive, from which it was read. It was the consensus that the intent of the language is not to provide permanent additions to the Board.

2. Report of Progress by Panels Working Under Psychological Strategy Board

Task Panel "A":

COLONEL DAVIS explained that the Korean contingency paper is undergoing condensation and emphasizing psychological activities rather than just propaganda. He indicated that the paper should be ready for submittal to the Board in the near future.

Task Panel "B":

COLONEL DAVIS described the selection as number one priority of the development of strategic plans in the cold war. Task groups have been activated to inventory cold war weapons and to study degree of adequacy or gaps in the means of implementing these weapons.

MR. WEBB asked how items in the inventory are classified. He noted the difficult decisions with which we are confronting the Russians, for instance, the restoration of Japan to the community of nations. He also asked whether our practical ability to use the weapons is taken into account, such as, availability of personnel, political feasibility, etc.

COLONEL DAVIS replied that these practical factors will be taken into account.

MR. WEBB suggested that the Panel should include some one familiar with the domestic political process. With respect to covert activities, for example, in order to secure funds, it is necessary to have people in whom the Congress has confidence and who can handle the task properly. He also stressed the importance of good public relations planning.

MR. GRAY observed that perhaps one member could handle both the public relations and political feasibility elements, and indicated that he would give attention to these aspects.

COLONEL DAVIS added that another task group is studying the intelligence problem relating to strategic planning and a preliminary paper on intelligence support has been prepared. Also, a codification and analysis of NSC policies bearing on psychological operations is in preparation.

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3. Consideration of Communist Activity in France and Italy (PSB D-5)

The Board agreed to proceed with the problem as proposed in the paper, i.e., "To prepare psychological strategy plans describing specific courses of action for the reduction of Communist power in France and Italy" (PSB D-5)

MR. GRAY gave the background of the meetings called by Mr. Harriman on this subject, at which it was urged that the PSB should take cognizance. He noted that the language of the agenda deliberately questioned whether the PSB should "undertake responsibility" in view of the general realization that the Board cannot "do everything." It was his opinion that the Board would likely approve this project, and he believed that Board action generally will assist in guiding the proper selection of problems for the staff.

MR. GRAY summarized his conversation with Italian Minister of Defense Randolfo Pacciardi. The Minister fears the possibility that the Communist Party could win the next administrative elections or succeed later in the year in forcing a general election. Without endorsing the judgment of the Minister, Mr. Gray passed it along as possibly useful.

MR. WEBB stated his belief that it is important to maintain the authority of the Ambassadors in both France and Italy.

MR. HARRIMAN agreed with the last point. He added that if about two years ago some organization similar to the PSB had been available for the exchange of views along the lines of the current problem, a more favorable situation might prevail in those countries today.

MR. GRAY also called attention to the excellent and comprehensive report which Mr. Dulles had prepared on this subject upon his return from abroad.

COLONEL DAVIS indicated that the new Task Panel "C" proposed in the paper would have guidance from a member of PSB staff and that representation would include ECA, the Department of State (with an MDAP specialist), CIA, each of the military services and the Department of Defense office for liaison with SHAPE, as well as consultants from the Departments of Commerce, Treasury (for foreign funds control problems), Agriculture, and Labor (for labor organization questions). The objective will be to develop specific projects in terms of feasibility and availability of resources. He added that an over-all plan would not be presented to the foreign governments concerned, which might alarm them, but rather a series of separate but consistent steps is planned.

The question of the population problem was considered and MR. WEBB suggested that a population expert therefore be included.

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It was agreed the State Department will be consulted on the extent to which coordination with the British on the problem might be desired.

The point was made that a group in Washington removed from the scene might make mistakes unless strengthened by experts returned from France and Italy to assist in the project.

It was agreed that the group should concentrate upon hitting the enemy at the source of his strength, including, for example, Communist schools, printing presses, etc. It was stressed that there is little time left and agreed that existing activities of the government dealing with this problem should not stop while Panel "C" is getting underway. It was indicated that Mr. John Sherman will be getting in touch with the participating agencies to assist in co-ordinating current actions.

4. Budget for Fiscal Year 1953, and New Staffing Table

MR. GRAY explained that he was not yet prepared to make a firm proposal for fiscal year 1953.

He recalled his statement at the last meeting to the effect that in the future in no case would the staff be increased to any where near double the approved staff of 52 positions. (PSB M-2, paragraph 11) A more accurate statement would have been that no doubling of the current projected fund requirement was expected. He believed that the maximum staff for fiscal year 1952 would be about 79 people, with an outside total for fiscal year 1953 of 99. It is anticipated that current allocations of funds from the agencies should be sufficient for fiscal year 1952, with the possible exception of new requirements necessitated by the acquisition of additional space. He stated he hoped to keep the staff to the minimum required strength. In response to a question from MR. WEBB, he indicated that a new budget proposal and staffing table would be made available to the members.

5. Responsibility of Department and Agency Representatives Working as Members of Panels under Psychological Strategy Board Staff

MR. GRAY expressed the opinion that in order to avoid rigidity and a tendency toward the lowest common denominator of departmental views, "instructed delegates" should not be sent to Panel meetings. He observed that the members should be fully cognizant of the views, limitations and capacities of their agencies in order that they may apply intelligent judgment in meetings. MR. WEBB inquired if there had been any difficulty of this kind in the operation of the panels, and MR. GRAY replied that he did not consider it a current problem.

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6. Information on Significant Current Developments (Postagenda Item)

MR. GRAY said that for the protection of the Board, the staff needs to keep advised of pertinent current developments in order to advise the Director or the Board with respect to crises in the psychological field. He asked the designation of specific contact points in the member agencies to which requests for flash information can be addressed. MR. WEBB named Mr. William J. McWilliams for this purpose in the State Department. Department of Defense contacts in OSD and in JCS (JSPD) will be designated, likewise in CIA. The need is primarily for spot reporting rather than "intelligence." Since the Board may be looked to, properly or not, as responsible in a number of psychological situations, this centralized information system is required.

GENERAL MAGRUDER observed that the situation is particularly difficult in the Department of Defense because the sources of information are so scattered.

MR. BARRETT commented that this arrangement will also call for internal machinery in the agencies so that the contact people are in fact being kept informed.

7. Minutes of the Meeting of August 13, 1951 (Postagenda Item)

MR. WEBB explained that he had not intended to draw a direct analogy with the Kremlin's "special group" in the statement attributed to him in paragraph 7. His intent rather had been to conceive of the PSB function as providing a focal point at which it can be determined where the responsible people are in the Government and what they are doing. With the agreement of the Board he submitted the following language, which more accurately reflects his meaning:

"7. Mr. Webb said it appeared from following the actions of the USSR that the Kremlin has a number of able people so positioned as to devote practically their full effort with great effectiveness to finding ways and means to maximize the strength of the USSR and break up that of the United States and its allies. He hoped that the members would conceive the function of the Psychological Strategy Board as that of drawing together in a more effective way the efforts of our own able people working in the psychological field. He thought the Psychological Strategy Board might do something both to improve the positioning of these able people which he feels sure are working in various governmental departments, and to provide a central place or focal point through which each group of specialists could get better acquainted with what the others were doing and develop working habits that would form the basis of better coordination and more effective results. Moreover, he believed the Board should discuss further many of the problems listed in PSB D-2 before the Staff completes its work and reaches a final position on the problems. He said that surveys take time and that we should not overlook each Board member's limited knowledge of the work of other agencies. He looked upon the Psychological Strategy Board as a central place for the members to

TOP SECRET

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MR. WEBB commented that the briefing planned after the meeting was an excellent idea and proposed a similar presentation of the total State Department effort in the information and education field. It was therefore agreed that the next meeting of the Board would be held at the Department of State, followed by a briefing.

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Copy 8 of 50

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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